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JURISDICTION 
This matter was transferred to the Court of Appeals by the Utah Supreme Court 
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(4). This Court has Jurisdiction to decide 
appellants' appeal pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)0-
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED O N APPEAL 
1. Issue: Did the trial court err when it dismissed with prejudice Plaintiff's 
First, Second and Third Causes of Action, under UTAH R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), for failure to 
state a claim? 
Standard of Review: "Because the propriety of a 12(b)[6] dismissal is a 
question of law, we give the trial court's ruling no deference and review it under a 
correctness standard." Doe v. Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 2004 UT App. 274, H 8, P.3d . 
2. Issue: Did the trial court err when it granted summary judgment in favor of 
Cathie and Couillard on Plaintiffs Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action? 
Standard of Review: "Because summary judgment is granted as a 
matter of law rather than fact, the appellate court is free to reappraise the trial court's 
legal conclusions. The appellate court reviews those conclusions for correctness, 
without according deference to the trial court." Brown v. l/l/e/s, 871 P.2d 552, 559 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994) (citations omitted). 
3. Issue: Did the trial court err when it overruled Plaintiff's Rule 56(f) 
objection? 
Standard of Review: "We review a district court's rule 56(f) discovery 
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rulings for abuse of discretion." Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co., 2003 UT 8, fl 56, 70 
P.3d 1, 14. 
APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULES 
UTAHR. CIV. P. 12(b)(6): 
Rule 12. Defenses and objections. 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim 
for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, 
cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive 
pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following 
defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: . . . 
(6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted . . . . A 
motion making any of these defenses shall be made before 
pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection 
is waived by being joined with one or more other defenses or 
objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading 
after the denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth 
a claim for relief to which the adverse party is not required to serve 
a responsive pleading, the adverse party may assert at the trial any 
defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion 
asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the 
pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters 
outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the 
court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment 
and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be 
given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent 
to such a motion by Rule 56. 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 56, Summary judgment. See Addendum 1. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This case deals with claims for the wrongful initiation, continuation or use of civil 
proceedings, arising out of a divorce case, a slander of a non-party to the divorce 
case's title to real estate, which real estate is not part of the marital estate in the divorce 
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case, and damages caused to one spouse by virtue of the other's filing of a false tax 
return that foreseeably resulted in an audit of the first. 
The civil proceedings in which the misconduct complained of took place involved 
appellant, Lynn G. Foster ("Lynn"), who was a respondent in the divorce action of 
Foster v. Foster, Case No. 004600010, in the Third District Court, Summit County, 
State of Utah (the "Divorce Action"). Lynn's ex-wife, Appelllee Cathie I. Foster 
("Cathie") was the petitioner in the Divorce Action. 
Cathie was represented in the Divorce Action by Appellees Evelyn L. Saunders 
("Saunders") and the law firm of Saunders & Saunders ("Law Firm"). During the course 
of the Divorce Action, Saunders, on Cathie's behalf, and, Lynn claims, as an abusive 
litigation tactic designed to impose needless expense on him, asserted a series of 
meritless claims, upon which Lynn prevailed and Cathie lost. These claims included the 
assertion by Cathie that Lynn, although well past the age of 65, at which many 
Americans retire, could not only not retire, but that he could not in any way reduce his 
income-producing activities during his elderly years, because he had chosen to marry a 
woman many years younger than him. Cathie, aided by Appellee Gary Couillard 
("Couillard"), her expert witness in the Divorce Action, asserted that assets owned by 
non-party entities, in which persons unrelated to the Divorce Action held ownership 
interests, could be ordered to be sold so that the Court could award Cathie $1.2 million 
in cash, instead of a percentage interest in marital property. This contention was made, 
and re-made, despite the fact that such sum of cash was not available through the 
marital estate. A summary of the false statements and groundless arguments made by 
Cathie, Saunders and Couillard in the Divorce Action, which were not pleaded, but 
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which obviously "could be proved" are set forth below in the statement of facts. 
Ultimately, the trial court in the Divorce Action ruled in Lynn's favor on these, and 
other, meritless assertions. The trial court expressly condemned the utterly abusive 
waste of resources caused by the making of such groundless assertions, chastising 
Cathie, Saunders and Couillard as follows: 
The court has seldom seen less credible analysis nor a more 
blatantly overworked file, with virtually no ultimate advancement of 
the client's position. When the expert's evidence (which was 
overwhelmingly passionate advocacy, not expert analysis) was 
considered in its totality, it did virtually nothing to aid the court's 
determination of the issues. . ..In addition, both the expert and 
petitioner's counsel chose to advance novel theories at significant 
cost in legal and accounting services to the client. 
Amended Complaint, fl 11. (R. 19-20). At the trial court level in this case, Saunders 
attempted to suggest that Lynn was somehow "disgruntled" with his result in the Divorce 
Action, and that his motive in asserting this action was founded in such displeasure. It is 
difficult to square Judge Hilder's rulings in favor of Lynn with any dissatisfaction on 
Lynn's part and, indeed, nothing could be further from the truth, as Lynn prevailed on 
every major issue he litigated. In any event, under Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56, such a 
proposition against Lynn could not be assumed. 
In addition to seeking recovery of all of the attorney fees, costs and expenses 
that were incurred by Lynn in responding to Cathie's abusive litigation tactics, Lynn 
asserted two claims, as assignee, for slander of title. Each of the assignors is a 
separate legal entity, not a party to the Divorce Action, and one of which neither Lynn 
nor Cathie had any interest in. Nevertheless, Cathie slandered the good and 
marketable title of these two entities in real estate they own by virtue of a statement she 
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made in an affidavit. One publication of that affidavit occurred via its filing in the 
Divorce Action. While Cathie asserts that the judicial privilege applies to that 
statement, the good title to this real estate owned by these non-parties to the Divorce 
Action could not be pertinent to the marital estate that was at issue in the Divorce 
Action., as a matter of law. The trial court nevertheless dismissed, under UTAH R. CIV. 
P. 12(b)(6). 
Finally, Lynn asserted claims against Cathy and Couillard for jointly participating 
in the filing of a false tax return by Cathie, the falsehoods in which foreseeably led to an 
IRS audit of Lynn's individual tax return. The trial court dismissed these causes under 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 56. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
Defendants moved to dismiss all Counts of the Amended Complaint, shortly after 
they were served with process. The defendants supported their motions with materials 
external to the Amended Complaint. The trial court refused to consider such materials, 
and dismissed Count I of the Amended Complaint, for the wrongful initiation, 
continuation and use of civil proceedings claim, and Counts II and III of the Amended 
Complaint, for slander of the title of two non-parties' real estate, which claims were 
assigned to Lynn, under UTAH R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), with prejudice, for failure to state a 
claim. At the same time, as to Counts IV and V, the trial court directed that the 
remaining defendants, Cathie and Couillard, re-assert their motion, as to Counts IV and 
V, by complying with the requirements of Rule 56, by setting forth factual statements as 
to which they contended there was no material dispute. Cathie made such a motion. 
Lynn responded to that motion with two Rule 56(f) affidavits, since discovery had not 
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yet even commenced, let alone been completed, and with such facts as he could 
present without discovery. The trial court implicitly denied the Rule 56(f) objection, 
because it granted summary judgment in favor of Cathie, on the remaining claims for 
breach of duty and interference, arising out of the filing of false tax returns by Cathie, 
under UTAH R. CIV. P. 56. Couillard then moved to join Cathie's motion, and Lynn 
stipulated that Couillard's position on those claims was identical with Cathie's, 
whereupon the trial court granted summary judgment to Couillard on Counts IV and V, 
as well, thereby resulting in a final judgment. 
C. Disposition By Trial Court. 
The trial court disposed of the first three causes of action on motion to dismiss, 
by dismissing the claims asserted therein with prejudice. The trial court granted 
summary judgment in favor of Cathie and Couillard on the fourth and fifth causes of 
action, thereby rendering final judgment on all claims against all parties. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Foster Family Properties, L.L.C., a Utah Limited Liability Company ("FFP") 
is the owner of certain real estate located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. Amended 
Complaint ("Am. Compl.") a t f l2 ; R. 18. 
2. Foster Rentals, L.C., a Utah Limited Liability Company ("FRLC") is the 
owner of certain real estate located in Salt Lake County and in Utah County, State of 
Utah. Am. Compl. at U 3; R. 18. 
3. Lynn is an individual who currently resides in Salt Lake County, but earlier 
resided in Summit County, Utah, when he was a party respondent in a divorce action 
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styled Cathie Foster, Petitioner v. Lynn G. Foster, Respondent, Case No. 004600010, 
in the Third District Court, Summit County, State of Utah. Am. Compl. at fl 4; R. 18. 
4. Defendant Cathie I. Foster ("Cathie"), Lynn's ex-wife, was the petitioner in 
the above-referenced divorce action. Am. Compl. at fl 5; R. 18. 
5. Defendant Evelyn L. Saunders ("Saunders") is an attorney, licensed to 
practice law in the state of Utah and a member of the Utah State Bar, and represented 
Cathie in the divorce action. Am. Compl. at fl 6; R. 18. 
6. The law firm of Saunders & Saunders is a general partnership consisting 
of defendant Evelyn L. Saunders and Barney R. Saunders, and is located in Park City, 
Utah (hereinafter "Law Firm"), which at all times was the employer of Saunders, and all 
acts of Saunders complained of herein were undertaken within the course and scope of 
her employment by Law Firm, which were also in truth and fact the acts of Law Firm, 
itself, and for which Law Firm is also liable. Am. Compl. at f l7 ; R. 18. 
7. Defendant Gary R. Couillard ("Couillard") was hired by Saunders as an 
expert witness in the divorce action between Cathie and Lynn. Am. Compl. at U 8; R. 
19. 
8. In addition to the standard issues raised in any divorce action, Saunders 
initiated, used and/or asserted meritless theories, bereft of any legitimate basis in either 
law, fact, or both. Am. Compl. at fl 9; R. 19. The trial court in the divorce action 
rejected these theories as typified in the following exchange: 
Ms. Saunders: What she is going to do is we 
determined that she will only get alimony for the life expectancy as 
opposed to the 22 years of marriage. It will be 13.1 years. And 
when he is not around anymore, she's got to look at what is it going 
to cost her to live for the rest of her life and it's not - -
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The Court: Try and support her at a level that she can 
prepare for these future years, you are really be [sic] default or 
effectively saying, "You are going to continue supporting me from 
the grave, because you are going to do a bunch up front so I can 
stay at that level." 
The reality is when the obligor dies or remarries, it's a 
different world. It's rough, but it's a different world. 
The Court: Have you got any legal support for this? I 
mean I do truly recognize it as creative. But do you have any legal 
support? 
Ms. Saunders: I'm forging new law. 
Tr. 134:25-135:19; R. 988-989. 
9. In an effort to artificially inflate the value of the marital assets, Coulliard 
sought and obtained an unauthorized second appraisal from Phil Cooke on the K Street 
apartments. Phil Cooke was selected by Saunders and Cathie with Court approval. 
The initial appraisal was court ordered. The second was not, but resulted from 
Coulliard's private challenge to Cooke of his initial appraisal. The difference was 
$80,000. The Court accepted the first and rejected the second K Street appraisal. R. 
901-904,913. 
10. Saunders and Couillard entered into an agreement with each other with 
respect to the advancement of these misplaced theories in the divorce action and each 
undertook one or more overt acts in furtherance thereof, thereby subjecting each of 
them to full liability as a co-conspirator for all of the damages caused by the conspiracy. 
As part of the conspiracy, Couillard intentionally misrepresented the facts of the case, 
and intentionally misrepresented expert opinions as valid when he knew they were not 
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valid in divorce cases, under the law, generally, under the facts of the case or under 
accepted accounting principles. Am. Compl. at U 10; R. 19. 
11. In his ruling in the divorce action, dated December 24, 2001, the 
Honorable Robert K. Hilder has specifically stated with respect to Couillard's 
participation in the conspiracy that: 
The court has seldom seen less credible analysis nor a 
more blatantly overworked file, with virtually no ultimate 
advancement of the client's position. When the expert's evidence 
(which was overwhelmingly passionate advocacy, not expert 
analysis) was considered in its totality, it did virtually nothing to aid 
the court's determination of the issues. 
R668. 
Indicting both Couillard and Saunders, Judge Hilder continued: 
In addition, both the expert and petitioner's counsel chose to 
advance novel theories at significant cost in legal and accounting 
services to the client. 
Am. Compl. at If 11; R. 19-20, 668. 
12. At least one of the meritless theories advanced by Saunders in the 
litigation was that Cathie and/or Lynn held some ownership interest in certain real 
estate owned by FRLC, and in other real estate owned by FFP, which Cathie had quit-
claimed to the contrary. Am. Compl. at fl 12; R. 20. 
13. Saunders caused Cathie to execute a false affidavit to that effect and 
Saunders then caused that false affidavit to be filed and published in the public record 
in the divorce litigation. Cathie did so knowing the averments in the affidavit to be false. 
Am. Compl. atf l 13; R. 20. 
14. That affidavit specifically, and falsely, stated "there are numerous 
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commercial properties in which this Affiant [Cathie] and/or the Respondent [Lynn] have 
an ownership interest." Am. Compl. at If 14; R. 20, 30-32 
15. In paragraph 5 of that affidavit, it falsely asserts that Cathie and/or Lynn 
owned legal title to property at 602, 612 and 614 East 300 South, in Salt Lake City, 
Utah, which property was in fact specifically and truthfully owned by FFP, pursuant to, 
among other things, a quit-claim deed signed by Cathie. Am. Compl. atf l 15; R. 20, 31. 
16. The affidavit also falsely asserted, contrary to deeds signed by Cathie, 
that Cathie and/or Lynn owned 831 and 835 First Avenue, in Salt Lake City, 65 "N" 
Street in Salt Lake City, 830 East Sixth Avenue in Salt Lake City, 374 Fourth Avenue in 
Salt Lake City, 128 "K" Street in Salt Lake City, and 229 East 900 North and 244 East 
950 North, both in Lehi, Utah, all of which belong to FRLC. Am. Compl. a t^ 16; R. 20. 
17. FRLC filed suit in the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
against Lynn and Cathie, Case No. 010901668, and obtained a judgment and decree 
quieting title on July 30, 2001. The judgment is final, as no appeal was timely taken. 
Am. Compl. atf l 17; R. 21. 
18. Without authority from Lynn, defendant Couillard prepared a Form 1040 
joint return naming Lynn and Cathie for filing by Cathie, alone, for the year 2000, which 
Form was executed solely by Cathie only on March 14, 2001 and submitted to the 
Internal Revenue Service. Am. Compl. at If 18; R. 21. That Form was false and 
fraudulent, and contained intentional misrepresentations by Couillard, in the following 
particulars: 
a. It purports to be "self-prepared" although Couillard prepared it. 
b. The form falsely claims exemptions for Lynn, Greg Foster and Brad 
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Foster, when there was no basis for an exemption for Lynn of any kind and Lynn 
provided more than one-half of the support for Greg Foster and Brad Foster and 
was, therefore, entitled to the exemptions for Greg Foster and Brad Foster. 
c. Couillard falsely represented in his preparation of the form that it 
was a joint return when he knew that it was not, in fact a joint return. Couillard 
knew Lynn had previously filed separate 2000 tax returns. 
Am. Compl. atU 19; R. 21. 
19. Cathie authorized Saunders and Couillard to perform all of their actions as 
her agents, and their acts are therefore legally also the acts of Cathie for which she is 
liable. Am. Compl. at H 20; R. 21. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Counts I, II and III of the Amended Complaint were dismissed by the trial court, 
with prejudice, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). That dismissal was erroneous, for 
the following reasons. Lynn properly pleaded the elements of each cause of action 
asserted in Counts I, II and III in sufficient fashion to comply with the notice pleading 
requirements of Utah R. Civ. P. 8. Defendants have fair notice of the claims against 
them and that is all that UTAH R. CIV. P. 8 requires. 
Defendants had submitted materials extraneous to the Amended Complaint in 
support of affirmative defenses that they asserted by way of their UTAH R. CIV. 
P. 12(b)(6) motions. Although the trial court did not convert the motion to one under 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 56 and, therefore, could not have considered those extraneous 
materials, it improperly adjudicated the affirmative defenses in favor of defendants. 
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The affirmative defense of judicial immunity upon which the trial court relied to dismiss 
Count I is not applicable to the tort of wrongful initiation, continuation and/or use of civil 
proceedings. The judicial privilege does not apply to Counts II and III because the title 
held in real estate by Foster Rentals, LC ("FRLC") and Foster Family Properties LC 
("FFP") was not at issue in the Divorce Action, those entities were not parties to the 
Divorce Action and both of those entities obtained a decree quieting title as between 
them and Cathie. The slander of title actions are not barred by statute of limitations 
because slander of title is an injury to real property which comes under the express 
three-year statute of limitations. Finally, claim preclusion does not bar FRLC's claim 
because its decree quieting title did not release any claim against Saunders' law firm 
and/or Couillard, who were not parties to that action and because the slander of title 
claim that was asserted in that action was dismissed without prejudice. 
As to the summary judgment entered on the claims arising from Cathie's filing of 
a false joint tax return that led to an IRS audit of Lynn's individual tax return and 
damages flowing therefrom, such summary judgment was improper because of the 
genuine issues of material fact contained in Lynn Foster's affidavit, because other, 
material facts were held exclusively by defendants or non-parties and could not be 
obtained by Lynn since discovery had not even commenced and because the 
foreseeability of an IRS audit could not be determined at such an early stage of the 
case without developing the facts. The trial court's refusal to allow Lynn to conduct 




I. LEGAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW APPLICABLE TO RULE 1 2 (B) (6 ) AND RULE 56 
DECISIONS. 
This case is before this Court for review of the dismissal with prejudice of Counts 
I, II and III of Lynn's Amended Complaint, under UTAH R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), and the grant 
of summary judgment in favor of Cathie and Couillard on Counts IV and V. Both of 
these rulings are reviewable under a "correctness" standard. "Because the propriety of 
a 12(b)[6] dismissal is a question of law, we give the trial court's ruling no deference 
and review it under a correctness standard." Doe v. Corporation of the President of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 2004 UT App. 274, fl 8, P.3d . "A 
trial court's grant or denial of summary judgment is reviewed for correctness." Snow v. 
Rudd, 998 P.2d 262, 265, 2000 UT 20, fl 9. 
A. STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO RULE 1 2(B)(6) MOTION. 
In passing on the legal sufficiency of a complaint, which is what the motions 
brought by Saunders, Law Firm, Cathie and Couillard asked the trial court to do with 
respect to Counts I, II and III of the Amended Complaint herein, and which this Court 
must analyze in its "correctness" review, a Court must take into account the standards 
of UTAH R. CIV. P. 8(a), 8(e)(1) and 8(f). See Blackham v. Snelgrove, 3 Utah 2d 157, 
159, 280 P.2d 453, 454 (1955)(To decide a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim, "Rules 12(b)(6), 8(a), 8(e)(1) and 8(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure must 
together be construed and their proper interpretation applied.") 
Rule 8(a) sets out what a complaint must contain in order to state a 
claim for relief: "A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief. . . 
shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing 
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that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for 
judgment" Rule 8(e)(1) provides in part: "A/o technical forms of 
pleading or motions are required" And Rule 8(f) states: "All 
pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice." 
Id. (emphasis added). Thus, a complaint is adequate if it "gives fair notice of the nature 
and basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type of litigation 
involved." Id., 3 Utah 2d at 160, 280 P. 2d at 455 (emphasis added).. 
As to the contents of the complaint itself, "[a] Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss 
admits the facts alleged in the Complaint but challenges the Plaintiffs right to relief 
based on those facts." Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263, 264 (Utah 1995) 
(quoting St Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194-96 (Utah 1991)). 
The factual allegations of the Complaint must be accepted "as true" and they must be 
considered together with "all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them in a light 
most favorable to the Plaintiff." Id. 
Further, a "dismissal is a severe measure and should be granted by the trial 
Court only if it is clear that a party is not entitled to relief under any state of facts 
which could be proved in support of its claim" Coleman v. Utah State Land Board, 
795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990)(emphasis added). Thus, if any state of facts could exist 
that might support the pleaded claim, regardless of whether the facts are pleaded, a 
dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is not appropriate, because the Court must assume that 
those facts will, in fact, be proved at trial. 
B. STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO RULE 56 MOTION. 
"On a motion for summary judgment, the moving party [here, Cathie and 
Couillard on Counts IV and V] bears the burden of proof for its motion, namely, the 
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burden of proving that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 
944 P.2d 327, 329 (Utah 1997) (on rehearing). "Summary judgment is appropriate only 
when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law." SME Industries, Inc. v. Thompson, Ventulett, 
Stainback, and Assoc, Inc., 28 P.3d 669, 673, 2001 UT 54, fl 9 (citing UTAH R. CIV. P. 
56(c)). 
"Doubts, uncertainties or inferences concerning issues of fact must be construed 
in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Litigants must be 
able to present their cases fully to the court before judgment can be rendered against 
them unless it is obvious from the evidence before the court that the party opposing 
judgment can establish no right to recovery. The trial court must not weigh evidence or 
assess credibility." Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Atkin, Wright & 
Miles, Chartered, 681 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1984) (footnotes omitted). 
II. LYNN PROPERLY PLEADED AND STATED A CLAIM FOR WRONGFUL INITIATION, 
CONTINUATION AND/OR USE OF CIVIL PROCEEDINGS. 
A. Count I Adequately Pleads Wrongful Initiation, Continuation And/Or 
Use of Civil Proceedings. 
Count I of the Amended Complaint asserts tort claims against all defendants for 
the wrongful initiation, continuation and/or use of civil proceedings. Gilbert v. Ince, 
1999 UT 65, 981 P.2d 841, appears to be the most recent, controlling Utah authority on 
this tort cause of action that redresses injuries caused by abusive litigation tactics. 
There are two elements to this cause of action: 
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The Restatement describes the pertinent criteria for wrongful use of 
civil proceedings as follows: 
One who takes an active part in the initiation, continuation, or 
procurement of civil proceedings against another is subject to 
liability to the other for wrongful civil proceedings if (a) he [or she] 
acts without probable cause, and primarily for a purpose other 
than that of securing the proper adjudication of the claim in which 
the proceedings are based, and (b) except when they are ex 
parte, the proceedings have terminated in favor of the person 
against whom they are brought. 
Id., H 18, 981 P.2d at 845 (quoting RESTATEMENT § 674)). The Amended Complaint 
clearly pleads the elements of this cause of action. For example, the Amended 
Complaint alleges, at fflj 23-24, R. 22, which allegations must be taken as true under 
UTAH R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6): 
23. Each of the defendants acted without probable cause 
and primarily for a purpose other than that of securing the proper 
adjudication of the particular theories on which they proceeded. 
24. With respect to the theories forming a part of this cause 
of action, the proceedings have terminated in favor of Lynn. 
Amended Complaint, ffij 23-24, R. 22. The defendants had fair notice of the pleaded 
claim. That is all that is required for Lynn to avoid dismissal under the standard of Rule 
12(b)(6). 
Cathie contended below that Lynn must expressly plead the term "malice." It is 
unclear whether the trial court adopted such contention as a basis for its ruling, but if it 
did, it was in error. First, that is not what the Utah Supreme Court said in Gilbert. 
Second, malice, in the legal sense, is encompassed by pursuing claims "for a purpose 
other than that of securing thefir] proper adjudication" as Lynn in fact has pleaded in If 
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23 of the Amended Complaint.1 See Albertson v. Raboff, 46 Cal. 2d 375, 383, 295 
P.2d 405, 410 (1956)("The malice required in an action for malicious prosecution is not 
limited to actual hostility or ill will toward plaintiff but exists when the proceedings are 
instituted primarily for an improper purpose [emphasis added]."). 
Cathie asserted below that there is no "winner" in a divorce action, and so there 
could never, as a matter of law, be a termination in favor of Lynn.2 She cited no 
1ln her memorandum supporting her motion to dismiss Count I, below, Cathie 
cited Baird v. Intermountain School Federal Credit Union, 555 P.2d 877 (Utah 1976) for 
an argument that Lynn must allege that the improper purpose was "harassment or 
annoyance." Cathie Mem., at 4. First and foremost, the Utah Supreme Court in Gilbert 
reviewed existing Utah law on the tort, which included Baird. See Gilbert, 1999 UT 65 
at fflf 15, 19, 981 P.2d at 844-46. The Court then expressly adopted, "[t]o preserve 
analytical clarity with respect to the species of torts permitting suit for misuse of judicial 
proceedings . . . the Restatements formulation of wrongful use of civil proceedings" 
as is set forth in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 674 (1977)(emphasis added). 
Thus, any statements in Baird must give way to the RESTATEMENT elements adopted in 
Gilbert, which do not so limit the improper purpose that will support a claim. Second, 
the Court in Baird supported its statement concerning harassment or annoyance by 
citation to two cases and the RESTATEMENT. Yet none of those authorities in fact 
purport to so restrict the tort. Because Baird was decided in the first instance on the 
ground that the original claim was meritorious, see Baird, 555 P.2d at 878, rather than 
groundless, as the Supreme Court stated was the prerequisite for the tort, see id., the 
statement concerning the secondary issue of harassment or annoyance at best was 
loose dictum. Under the RESTATEMENT, "instituting a civil proceeding when one does 
not believe his claim to be meritorious is not acting for the purpose of securing the 
proper adjudication of his claim." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 676, comment c. 
"He cannot believe that the claim is meritorious, however, if he knows that it is a false 
one based upon manufactured or perjured testimony, or if he realizes that the 
adjudication will not be in his favor unless the court or jury is misled in some way. He is 
then abusing the general purpose of bringing civil proceedings and is not seeking a 
proper adjudication of the claim on which the civil proceeding is based." Id. 
2Lynn is constrained to point out that, regardless of whether there are "winners" 
in divorce actions, there most certainly are issues and claims asserted by each party in 
a divorce action. When the Utah Supreme Court discussed the elements of the tort in 
Gilbert, it specifically adopted RESTATEMENT § 674, which covers far more abuses that 
the simple filing of an initial claim. The RESTATEMENT speaks of "acts" undertaken 
(continued...) 
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authority for that proposition, and the Gilbert decision, adopting the RESTATEMENT 
elements, does not purport to exempt spurious claims raised in divorce litigation from 
other meritless civil proceedings. The pleaded portion of Judge Hilder's ruling, see 
Amended Complaint, H 11 (R. 19-20), certainly gives rise to inferences that Judge 
Hilder ruled against claims asserted by Cathie I. Foster in the divorce action, terminated 
those claims in favor of the Lynn herein, and expressed his dismay at the expense that 
those spurious theories caused.3 In addition, Lynn has expressly pleaded that result, 
see Amended Complaint, Tf 24 (R. 22) ("With respect to the theories forming a part of 
this cause of action, the proceedings have terminated in favor of Lynn."), and nothing 
within the four corners of the amended complaint could compel a contrary conclusion. 
The full scope of Judge Hilder's ruling, the claims terminated in Lynn's favor and the 
expense to which Lynn was put defending spurious claims is a matter for discovery and 
trial. Since the allegations of the complaint must be taken as true, and all inferences 
2(...continued) 
without probable cause, in the "initiation, continuation, or procurement of civil 
proceedings against another. . .." Id. 
3Those, separate claims, are the ones Lynn's amended complaint herein 
properly pursues: 
Where more than one claim is asserted in a proceeding, it is 
proper for the court to review each claim separately to determine if 
it satisfies the delict's critical elements. 
If a claim is terminated in favor of the malicious-prosecution 
plaintiff, an action for malicious prosecution will lie on that singular 
claim, regardless of who prevails on other claims pressed in the 
same suit. 
Greenberg v. Wolfberg, 890 P.2d 895, 904 (Okla. 1995). 
18 
drawn in favor of Lynn, and states of facts may be proved in support of the claim, it 
should not be dismissed. 
Finally, Cathie asserted below that, because she relied entirely upon advice of 
Saunders and Law Firm, Lynn cannot, as a matter of law, assert a claim against her. 
The Amended Complaint pleads Cathie's lack of good faith, and willful conduct: "Each 
of the defendants acted without probable cause and primarily for a purpose other than 
that of securing [a] proper adjudication.. . ." Amended Complaint, U 23 (R. 22); "The 
defendants either knew or should have known that the claims were not meritorious. . .." 
Id. 1| 26 (R. 22); "The actions of the defendants were undertaken intentionally, willfully 
and/or with a reckless disregard of the rights of Lynn. . . ." Id. fl 28 (R. 23). The 
Amended Complaint alleges that Cathie knowingly signed an affidavit falsely claiming 
that she or Lynn had an interest in real property that she knew she had previously 
deeded to two separate legal entities. See Amended Complaint, ffif 12-16 (R. 20). 
Clearly, Cathie's lack of good faith is at issue, is subject to the full panoply of discovery 
and must be litigated. Cathie may choose to assert an affirmative defense in her 
answer that she acted in good faith reliance upon advice of counsel, but her 
contentions in that regard do not defeat the allegations of the Amended Complaint on a 
motion to dismiss. 
B. The Defense of "Judicial Privilege" Is Inapplicable to the Tort of 
Wrongful Initiation, Continuation or Use of Civil Proceedings. 
Saunders, Law Firm and Cathie argued below, and convinced the trial court, that 
they are immune from their misconduct in litigation, because of the "judicial privilege" 
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they are afforded under Utah law to fully and freely participate in judicial proceedings. 
This "privilege," they argue, sanctions whatever misconduct they may commit, so long 
as it is "related to" the judicial proceeding. 
That argument seems, on its face, to conflict with the very existence of the tort 
which is pleaded. It simply does not make any sense that the same RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS (upon which, as will be discussed below, the Utah Supreme Court 
relied in its definition of the judicial privilege) would also be adopted by the Utah 
Supreme Court in defining the tort of wrongful initiation, continuation or use of judicial 
proceedings, if no one could assert the tort in the face of the privilege. At least one 
court has expressly addressed this seeming paradox and resolved it in favor of the 
viability of the tort of wrongful civil proceedings, stating: 
The judicial privilege has long existed in jurisdictions which, 
like Pennsylvania, recognize the tort of wrongful use of civil 
proceedings. These two policies-protection of communications 
necessary to the litigation of claims and imposition of liability for 
wrongful use of civil proceedings-can coexist because imposition 
of liability for the wrongful use of civil proceedings occurs only 
when litigation is instituted both without probable cause and 
primarily for a purpose other than that of securing the proper 
adjudication of the claim in which the proceedings are based and 
because, when these requirements are met, immunity for the filing 
of the complaint is not necessary to further the interests protected 
by judicial immunity. 
Silver v. Mendel, 894 F.2d 598, 603-04 (3d Cir. 1990)(emphasis in original & footnote 
omitted). 
A studied review of the judicial privilege provides an even more clear analytical 
path to separate the tort from the judicial privilege. Lynn's claim in Count I is based on 
defendants' wrongful conduct in initiating, continuing or pursuing meritless claims for 
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an improper purpose. Defendants below have attempted to mischaracterize Lynn's 
claims as being exclusively dependent on the false statements made by Cathie in her 
affidavit in the Divorce Action. Of course, the comments of Judge Hilder that are 
pleaded in the Amended Complaint go far beyond Cathie's submission of a bad faith 
and false affidavit, and this Court must, under Rule 12(b)(6), infer from Judge Hilder's 
scathing remarks, that many other facts exist that can be proved in support of the claim 
and to explain fully Judge Hilder's disgust with what he witnessed. 
The tort differs in no material respect from Rules 11, 37 or 56(g), liability under 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-56 or the inherent powers of the court, or a contempt citation, 
with regard to litigation misconduct. Each of those is based on a "statement" in 
litigation, indeed, Rule 56(g) deals with bad faith affidavits, yet no "judicial privilege" has 
ever been recognized to offer sanctuary to a litigant, attorney or witness from the 
sanctions that flow from their misconduct in litigation in making these spurious and false 
statements, without probable cause or for, by their "statements," asserting and pursuing 
meritless claims. This is true even though the miscreant may, indeed, be privileged 
against all manner of damages for reputational injury, whether the claim be defamation, 
interference, emotional distress or otherwise. The public policy issues that preclude 
application of any "judicial privilege" to those sanctions apply with equal force to prohibit 
its application to a recognized tort cause of action to address abusive litigation tactics 
The history and scope of the "judicial privilege" is not, in any event, so broad as 
the defendants would have this Court believe. The Utah courts have relied on the 
RESTATEMENT for their formulation of the "judicial privilege," see, e.g., Price v. Armour, 
949 P.2d 1251 (Utah 1997), so the RESTATEMENT is a good starting point for any 
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analysis. The Scope Note for Division 5 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS notes 
that Chapter 25 of the RESTATEMENT deals with defenses to defamation-based claims. 
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 SC NT (1977). Topic 2 of Chapter 25 of the 
RESTATEMENT sets forth absolute privileges to defamation-based claims. RESTATEMENT 
§ 585 sets forth the absolute privilege for judicial officers, RESTATEMENT § 586 sets forth 
the absolute privilege for attorneys at law, and RESTATEMENT § 588 sets forth the 
absolute privilege for witnesses. All of these "judicial privilege" defenses, as defined in 
the RESTATEMENT, are applicable exclusively to the Topic 2, Division 5 tort of 
defamation. The "judicial privilege," such as it exists, therefore does not apply to any 
injury that does not flow from a statement due to its defamatory nature. Claims based 
on injury in the litigation, itself, due to misconduct, even if the misconduct is false 
statements to the Court misconduct, rather than any injury derived from a loss to 
reputation due to a statement, are simply not within the scope of the privilege as 
defined by the RESTATEMENT, nor as it has in fact been applied in Utah cases. 
The Utah cases on "judicial privilege seem few in number. Defendants below 
appeared to rely on four cases. In Riddle v. Perry, 2002 UT 10, 40 P.3d 1128, the Utah 
Supreme Court adopted RESTATEMENT § 590A, pertaining to witnesses before 
legislative bodies. Id. at j j 11, 40 P.3d at 1133. The claim was clearly a defamation 
claim, covered by the RESTATEMENTS privileges against defamation claims. See id. at 
1J114-5, 40P.3dat1131. 
In Price v. Armour, 949 P.2d 1251 (Utah 1997), the Utah Supreme Court held 
that the judicial privilege was a bar to claims for damages for lost business opportunities 
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flowing from personal defamatory statements that interfered with business relations. 
See id. at 1258 (judicial privilege applies to all legal theories arising from operative facts 
constituting defamatory publication). In other words, the "interference" alleged in that 
case was that a defamatory statement in a letter was designed to "interfere" with the 
contractual relationship between the plaintiff, Price (a lawyer), and his client, who 
received the letter. 
In DeBryv. Godbe, 1999 UT 111, 992 P.2d 979, the Utah Supreme Court held 
that the "judicial privilege" barred claims for damages flowing from emotional distress, 
when that emotional distress was caused by personal defamatory statements. Again in 
that case, the operative facts for the claim encompassed a defamatory letter, and the 
emotional distress claim depended entirely upon the defamatory nature of the 
communication in the letter. The entire discussion of the judicial privilege was within 
the context of a statement that was defamatory. See id. at ffij 11-15, 992 P.2d at 983-
84. 
Defendants also relied on Bennett v. Jones Waldo Holbrook & McDonough, 
2003 UT 9, 70 P.3d 17. A review of the facts of that case discloses that it, too, is of no 
aid to defendants. Specifically, when the Utah Supreme Court discussed the intentional 
infliction of emotional distress claim, the Utah Supreme Court noted that the allegations 
of Bennett's complaint for damages from intentional infliction of emotional distress were 
for "reputational damages." See 2003 UT 9 at fl 65, 70 P.3d at 31. Likewise, on the 
deceit claim, the Utah Supreme Court, citing an earlier decision, stated: "The judicial 
proceeding privilege extends not only to defamation claims but to 'all claims arising from 
the same statements.'" 2003 UT 9, at fl 77, 70 P.3d at 34. Thus, the judicial 
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proceedings privilege does not apply if there are not "statements" that would give rise to 
defamatory claims for "reputational damages" as well as other claims based on the 
injury to reputation. It is also important to keep in mind when reading the Bennett 
decision that its discussion of and pronouncements on judicial privilege appear to be 
entirely obiter dicta. The trial court had dismissed the intentional infliction of emotional 
distress and deceit claims on other grounds, which dismissal was affirmed by the Utah 
Supreme Court. The trial court apparently had not considered the issue of judicial 
privilege and it seems that the parties did not raise the issue. The question of judicial 
privilege was therefore not properly before the Utah Supreme Court for determination, 
did not need to be determined since the trial court's dismissal was affirmed on the 
grounds decided, and was not the holding of the Court. 
Lynn's claim in Count I is not for damage flowing from any defamatory 
statement, but rather, it is for damages flowing from the need to defend against 
spurious litigation. The judicial privilege applies solely to claims flowing from the results 
of the personal defamatory nature of "defamatory statements," albeit regardless of the 
legal theory utilized to assert those claims. Lynn's claim in Count I is based, not on any 
defamatory nature of statements, but instead, on defendants' conduct in asserting 
meritless claims. It is this wrongful conduct that has injured Lynn through the expense 
and other damages caused to Lynn by virtue of the assertion, continuation and/or use 
of those claims. The judicial privilege that applies to the making of defamatory 
statements is inapplicable to such conduct. 
An almost identical situation arose in a probate proceeding in California, 
stemming from an unsuccessful will contest. The California Supreme Court, in bank, 
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reversed the grant of a general demurrer, determining that the abusive litigation tort was 
applicable even though not all grounds in the contest lacked probable cause. See 
Crowley v. Katleman, 8 Cal. 4th 666, 694, 881 P.2d 1083, 1099, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386, 
402 (Cal. 1994). In reaching that conclusion, the Court reasoned: 
It is true that untrammeled access to the courts promotes 
social peace by providing the citizenry with an alternative to 
potentially dangerous self-help methods of redressing private 
grievances. But it is not an unmixed blessing: many of our courts 
are burdened by overcrowded dockets and long delays, and all 
litigation exacts both public and private costs. We are willing as a 
society to incur those burdens and costs when the litigation is well 
founded or, even when ultimately unsuccessful, was at least 
initiated with probable cause and without malice. In those 
circumstances the balance tips in favor of the policy of encouraging 
judicial access. That policy becomes counterproductive, however, 
when it operates to promote litigation that is groundless and 
motivated by malice; such litigation has no place in our judicial 
system, and we are therefore unwilling to bear its costs. After 
careful consideration, we see no reason to reach a different result 
when the litigation in question is the assertion of baseless and 
malicious grounds of liability in a single lawsuit: in both instances 
the balance tips in favor of the policy of making whole the 
individuals harmed by such abuse of our courts. 
Id. (footnote omitted). There is no distinction between the reasoned basis for the rule's 
application in that case, from its application here. Where defendants conspired to 
maliciously assert baseless claims in the divorce and run up Lynn's litigation costs, 
Lynn should have a remedy. Lynn, as is obvious from Judge Hilder's ruling, was quite 
satisfied with the result in the divorce. He is not satisfied that he had to expend funds 
defeating one spurious claim after the other raised by defendants to get the final result 
he did. 
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II. COUNT II AND III ADEQUATELY PLEAD SLANDER OF TITLE; THEY DO NOT PLEAD 
SUFFICIENT FACTS TO MAKE OUT ANY AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES. 
The trial court dismissed the slander of title claims of FRLC and FFP, assigned 
to Lynn, based on several affirmative defenses raised in Cathie's motion to dismiss:4 
(1) judicial privilege; (2) as to FFP, claim preclusion; and (3) based on the statute of 
limitations. Such dismissal was erroneous. 
A. The Affirmative Defense Of Judicial Privilege Was Not Proved Based 
On the Amended Complaint's Allegations. 
In order to be successful on the affirmative defense of judicial privilege, 
defendants would have had to show that the Amended Complaint's allegations, alone, 
under Rule 12(b)(6), prove: (1) The statement was made during or in the course of 
judicial proceedings; (2) the statement has some reference to the subject matter of the 
proceeding; and (3) the statement was made by a judge, juror, litigant or counsel. See 
Price v. Armour, 949 P.2d 1251, 1256 (Utah 1997). Since Cathie's affidavit was 
intended to be filed in her divorce proceeding, element (1) is clearly established by the 
4The Utah Supreme Court recently reiterated the general impropriety of asserting 
affirmative defenses in Rule 12(b)(6) motions, premised on allegations outside of the 
complaint, itself: 
Because dismissal under rule 12(b)(6) is "justified only when the 
allegations of the complaint itself clearly demonstrate that the 
plaintiff does not have a claim," 5A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. 
Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1357 at 345 (2d ed. 
1990)(emphasis added), this general rule recognizes that 
affirmative defenses, which often raise issues outside of the 
complaint, are not generally appropriately raised in a motion to 
dismiss under rule 12(b)(6). 
Tucker v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 2002 UT 54, fl 7, 53 P.3d 947, 949-
50. 
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allegations of Amended Complaint fflj 13-14. Element (3), Cathie's status as a party in 
the divorce litigation, is clearly established by the allegations of Amended Complaint fl 
5. 
FFP and FRLC's title to their real estate was not, however, in any way, at issue 
in the Divorce Action, to which they were not parties. Therefore, with respect to the 
second element that the statement has "some reference to the subject matter of the 
proceeding," the case of Wright v. Lawson, 530 P.2d 823 (Utah 1975) is instructive. 
There, the Utah Supreme Court differentiated the much broader immunity in England 
from the narrower, American rule, represented by the second element: 
It is the rule in England that immunity exists as to any 
utterance arising out of a judicial proceeding and having any 
reasonable relation to it, although it is quite irrelevant as to any 
issue involved. The majority of American courts have adopted the 
rule that there is no immunity unless particular statements are in 
some way "relevant" or "pertinent" to some issue in the case. The 
words "relevant" and "pertinent" have a technical meaning in legal 
parlance and we believe it would be advantageous to adopt a rule 
that the statement alleged to be libelous must have some 
relationship to the cause or subject involved. 
Id. at 825 (footnotes omitted). The second element thus represents the narrower, 
American rule, as expressed by the Utah Supreme Court in Wright. Another case also 
helps illustrate the application of the rule, in determining what constitutes a lis pendens, 
covered by the judicial privilege.5 
5ln Hansen v. Kohler, 550 P.2d 186 (Utah 1976), the Utah Supreme Court 
recognized that notices of lis pendens are covered by the judicial privilege: "The clear 
weight of authority describing the office of a lis pendens is well stated in Albertson v. 
Raboff, wherein the court reasoned that since the effect of a lis pendens is to give 
constructive notice of all the facts apparent on the face of the pleadings, the recordation 
of a notice of lis pendens is, in effect, a republication of the pleadings. Since the 
(continued...) 
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The Utah Court of Appeals, in Winters v. Schulman, 1999 UT App. 119, 977 
P.2d 1218, held that a lis pendens was invalid where the claim asserted in a divorce 
action by the person who recorded the lis pendens "did not seek title to or possession 
of the Utah property." 1999 UT App. 119 at^J 18, 977 P.2d at 1223. The court then 
remanded to the trial court to determine damages against the attorney who recorded 
the lis pendens, under the wrongful lien statute. Clearly, where title to property is 
slandered in litigation that does not attack, as part of the pleaded claims, the owner's 
title, the slander of the owner's title does not have some reference to the proceeding. 
Cathie argued below that FRLC's property was "at issue" in the divorce 
proceeding. Cathie Mem. at 7. That assertion is untrue on its face, because the 
Divorce Action treated only the property of the parties, and the real property involved 
was owned by FRLC and FFP, separate and independent legal entities under the laws 
of the state of Utah, as the Amended Complaint pleads. Further, the Amended 
Complaint in this case does not plead the contents of the divorce complaint or of the 
decree, so there is nothing from which, in the four corners of the amended complaint, 
from which a conclusion as to the second element of the affirmative defense of judicial 
privilege could be reached. Under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must infer that facts exist 
that would show the statement had no reference to the Divorce Action. What is 
pleaded is the conveyance of real property, by deeds executed by Cathie, to Foster 
Rentals, L.C. ("FRLC"), a Utah limited liability company, and Foster Family Properties, 
5(.. .continued) 
publication of the pleadings is absolutely privileged, the republication thereof by 
recording a notice of lis pendens is similarly privileged." Id. at 190 (footnote omitted). 
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L.C. ("FFP"). Amended Complaint, ffl[ 12, 15-16 (R. 20), 34-36 (R. 24-25). The 
Amended Complaint pleads that Cathie falsely asserted in her affidavit that either Lynn 
or Cathie owned an interest in that real property, when in truth she knew FRLC and 
FFP owned it. The Amended Complaint also pleads that FRLC and FFP pursued 
separate litigation to obtain, and did obtain, a quiet title judgment. Amended Complaint, 
H 17 (R. 20). 
Lynn is entitled, on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, to the reasonable inference that, had 
the Divorce Action contained any claims that the deeds to FRLC or FFP were procured 
by fraud, or in any way void, such that Lynn or Cathie had any interest, that the divorce 
court would have had jurisdiction over the claims and the quiet title action would not 
have gone forward, because that court would not have had jurisdiction. Since the quiet 
title action did go forward to judgment, no such claims as to ownership of an interest 
could have existed thereafter in the divorce action. 
Also, the Court must, on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, infer that FRLC and FFP, 
necessary parties to any such claim, were not joined as a parties in the Divorce Action, 
so no such claims could have been part of that action. Because the validity of FFP's 
and FRLC's ownership of their real property was not a cause in or the subject of the 
Divorce Action, the second element of judicial privilege in that the statement does not 
have "some reference to the subject matter of the proceeding." This is no different from 
recording a lis pendens in a divorce proceeding where title to real property is not at 
issue and being liable under the wrongful lien statute.6 
6Lynn notes that Cathie argued that "in the Ruling dated December 24, 2001, the 
(continued...) 
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B. The Affirmative Defense Of Statute of Limitations Was Not Proved 
Based On the Amended Complaint's Allegations. 
Defendants successfully convinced the trial court that Counts II and III of the 
Amended Complaint, representing the assigned claims of FRLC and FFP for slander of 
title are barred by a one-year statute of limitations, citing to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-
29(4), which applies to actions "for libel [and] slander. . . ." Id. Defendants had cited 
Valley Colour v. Beuchert Builders, Inc., 944 P.2d 361 (Utah 1997), for the proposition 
that the claims of FRLC and FFP arose at the times FRLC and FFP incurred their 
special damages, namely, on the dates the respective quiet title actions were resolved.7 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized, however, that slander claims, which are 
personal in nature, are substantively distinct from slander of title claims, which are not 
personal in nature and deal with injury to economic interests in real property. In Bass v. 
Planned Management Servs., Inc., 761 P.2d 566 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court 
differentiated between the nature of the tort of slander, which is a personal tort, and the 
nature of the tort of slander of title, which is not a personal tort and does not protect a 
%. .continued) 
court determined that Cathie had a 'marital interest' in half of FRLC's property." Cathie 
Mem. at 8. Judge Hilder's ruling was not part of the pleadings, so Cathie's proffered 
interpretation of it was immaterial to her motion to dismiss. This Court must infer, on a 
motion to dismiss, that Judge Hilder, at most, valued whatever respective ownership in 
FRLC, as an entity, that Cathie and Lynn held. If the trial court or this Court wanted to 
go beyond the pleadings it would have to take judicial notice of the Honorable Timothy 
Hanson's "Judgment Quieting Title" in FRLC, and against Cathie, entered in Case No. 
010901218, in the Third District Court for Salt Lake County, that FRLC obtained on May 
3, 2001, seven months before Judge Hilder's ruling. 
7Plaintiff does note that those dates are not pleaded anywhere in the amended 
complaint, and a motion to dismiss pursuant to UTAH R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) could therefore 
not be granted on this issue even if the statute Saunders argue is applicable were 
applicable. However, it is not. 
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person's reputation: 
Use of the term "slander" in the name of the action for 
slander of title has led to analogies between actions for defamation 
and actions for slander of title.[] However, despite the similarity 
in the names of the torts, there is a basic distinction between 
the two. They protect separate and unrelated interests. The tort 
of slander of title and the related tort of disparagement of property 
are based on an intentional interference with economic relations. 
They are not personal torts; unlike slander of the person, they do 
not protect a person's reputation. Slander of title actions are based 
only on palpable economic injury and require a plaintiff to prove 
special damages, whereas injury to personal reputation may be 
based on both tangible and intangible losses and give rise to 
presumed and general damages. 
Id. at 568 (emphasis added & citation omitted). It is clear from the foregoing statement 
that the tort of slander of title encompasses special damages flowing from injury to real 
property. 
The Utah Legislature has passed a statute of limitations expressly governing 
injury to real property, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-26(1), which provides a limitations 
period as follows: "An action may be brought within three years . . . for. . . injury to real 
property. . . ." Id. The judgment of the Legislature in providing a specific statute of 
limitations for injury to real property must control over the general slander limitations 
period. See Taghipourv. Jerez, 2001 UT App. 139, H 13, 26 P.3d 885, 888 (It is a 
"well-established rule of construction that specific statutory provisions prevail over 
general statutory provisions."). 
Assessing the identical question under California's statutes of limitations, and 
relying on the substantive distinctions between the nature of the torts, like the Utah 
Supreme Court has articulated in Bass, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
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Circuit reached the inescapable conclusion that the three year, injury to real property 
statute, not the one year defamation statute, was the applicable limitations period: 
"Slander of title is a tort action for redress of an invasion of a 
particular property right, that of immediate salability [sic] of the 
property involved. As a cause of action arising out of a violation of 
a property right it survives the death of its owner."... In the face of 
this reasoning by the California courts, it would seem that an action 
for "slander of title" to real property is within the three year limitation 
applicable to "an action for trespass or injury to real property" rather 
than within the one year limitation period [for libel and slander]. 
The trial judge was in error in holding that this action was controlled 
by [the one-year limitations period] which deals with personal 
injuries, such as libel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment, 
seduction and injuries resulting from negligence. 
Howard v. Hudson, 259 F.2d 29, 32 (9th Cir. 1958)(citation in quotation omitted). The 
same conclusion logically pertains under Utah's statutes, in light of the Utah Supreme 
Court's recognition in Bass of the substantive differences between the two torts and the 
Legislature's adoption of a limitations period specific to injury to real property. 
C. The Affirmative Defense Of Claim Preclusion Was Not Proved Based 
On the Amended Complaint's Allegations. 
The trial court erroneously granted defendants' claim preclusion argument as to 
Count II. The claim preclusion affirmative defense fails, on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, 
because it requires that the Court assess facts outside of those pleaded in the 
Amended Complaint that would be essential to establishing any such affirmative 
defenses. This tactic is improper on a rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Colman v. Utah State 
Land Board, 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990)(limiting review on a rule 12(b)(6) motion 
"solely to the material allegations of [the] complaint. . ..")8 
'The Utah Supreme Court recently reiterated the impropriety of asserting 
(continued...) 
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The judgments quieting title in FRLC and FFP do not release Saunders, Law 
Firm or Couillard as joint tortfeasors, and Saunders, Couillard and Law Firm were not 
parties to the quiet title actions. FFP has not asserted any claim against Cathie for 
slander of title, for the reason that it settled with its claim, as against Cathie, as part of 
obtaining its judgment. FRLC's judgment of quiet title contains no release of any 
person. It is therefore not possible for claim preclusion, an affirmative defense, to be 
established by the Amended Complaint's allegations, so as to allow any dismissal 
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). 
III. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF 
CATHIE AND COUILLARD ON COUNTS IV AND V. 
It is undisputed that Cathie, herself, created a relationship with Lynn by placing 
Lynn's name and social security number on her tax return. It is an obvious risk that 
reporting false information to the Internal Revenue Service may trigger an audit. It is 
also an obvious risk that the audit might involve Lynn where Cathie has falsely reported 
information concerning Lynn's filing status and deductions, using Lynn's social security 
8(...continued) 
affirmative defenses in Rule 12(b)(6) motions, premised on allegations outside of the 
complaint, itself: 
Because dismissal under rule 12(b)(6) is "justified only when the 
allegations of the complaint itself clearly demonstrate that the 
plaintiff does not have a claim," 5A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. 
Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1357 at 345 (2d ed. 
1990)(emphasis added), this general rule recognizes that 
affirmative defenses, which often raise issues outside of the 
complaint, are not generally appropriately raised in a motion to 
dismiss under rule 12(b)(6). 
Tucker v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 2002 UT 54, fi 7, 53 P.3d 947, 949-
50. 
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number. All of those facts are undisputed. Cathie therefore clearly had a duty, when 
submitting Lynn's name and social security number on her tax return to the Internal 
Revenue Service, to do so in such a fashion as to avoid the foreseeable risk of an audit 
of Lynn's own, individual return, based on the false information Cathie reported. 
Significantly, the issue is not whether Cathie would foresee in this particular case 
how the Internal Revenue Service would in fact respond - it was foreseeable that an 
audit could result from such inaccurate reporting. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS states: "If the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to 
another, the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of 
the harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable." 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435(1). 
Cathie's assertions that she could not have foreseen that her filing of a false 
return would damage Lynn are therefore not capable of affording her a defense, and 
summary judgment should not have been granted to her. This is especially true in the 
face of Lynn's affidavit, R. 408-446, which, based on the information that was available 
to Lynn even in the absence of the commencement of discovery, raises many issues of 
fact about the circumstances of the filing of Cathie's false tax return, R. 410-413, at ffij 
9-14, the intent of the filing, see id., and Cathie and Couillard's credibility, R. 413-422, 
at HH 15-17. 
It is noteworthy that Cathie filed a copy of Lynn's tax return in this litigation, in 
violation of a protective order that had been entered in the Divorce Action. Id. R. 416, 
at fl 16. That brazen disregard of Judge Hilder's protective order, alone, would allow 
the inference of bad faith in Cathie's filing of the false return and the possible intent of 
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doing harm to Lynn. 
The trial court had already sustained the viability of Lynn's interference cause of 
action in Count V of the Amended Complaint, when it denied the motion to dismiss that 
claim. Nothing had changed between the time of that ruling and the motion for 
summary judgment on Count V. There clearly is a prospective economic advantage to 
Lynn in procuring his tax refund timely. While Cathie argued that she did not act with 
intent to interfere or with knowledge to a substantial certainty that her conduct would 
interfere, those are factual issues that should have been allowed to be explored in 
discovery, and, as to which, Lynn's affidavit, R. 408-446, raised a genuine issue of 
material fact. 
Cathie argued that she did not make her false filing for an improper purpose or 
by improper means. Again, those are fact intensive issues. The trial court's grant of 
summary judgment was presumably based, again, on its erroneous conclusion that the 
interference was not foreseeable. As pointed out above, such a conclusion, without a 
factual record to support it, and in light of the genuine issues of material fact concerning 
Cathie and Couillard's credibility and intent, cannot be sustained on summary judgment. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO ALLOW DISCOVERY 
O N COUNTS IV AND V BEFORE CONSIDERING SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Counts IV and V of the Amended Complaint sought relief for damages caused to 
Lynn by the occurrence of an IRS audit of his individual tax return, which audit, Lynn 
alleges, was caused by Cathie's filing of a false, joint return. Lynn suffered substantial 
expense in the course of being required to hire an accountant to respond to the audit, 
and he suffered lost investment opportunity for the substantial refund he would have 
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received much sooner than he did, but for the audit. Lynn cast his theories for that 
relief as a breach of duty and interference claim. UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(f) allows a court to 
refuse a motion for summary judgment where essential discovery has not yet been 
taken. See UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(f). 
In this case, the Rule 56(f) Affidavit of David W. Scofield, explains that the facts 
surrounding the relationship between Couillard and Cathie, which are pertinent to 
Counts IV and V, are exclusively within the knowledge of Couillard, Cathie and 
Saunders, and would be revealed fully only by document requests to those three 
persons and by taking their depositions. Couillard and Cathie had not even filed an 
answer at the time of their motions for summary judgment on Counts IV and V, and 
discovery in the case had not even commenced. The issues of the case had not been 
framed to allow for preparation of any discovery plan and no discovery had taken place. 
To the extent that the issue of whether Couillard was the agent of Cathie was 
material to the case, it is an issue that could not proceed on summary judgment until 
discovery was completed. Even Cathie's memorandum supporting her motion 
conceded that "[wjhether an agency relationship exists depends on the facts and 
circumstances of the case." Cathie's MSJ Memo at 7 (R. 335). The motion is clearly 
premature on that issue. 
The trial court apparently based summary judgment on Counts IV and V on its 
ruling, as a matter of law, that it could not be foreseeable that the filing of a false, 
joint, tax return by one spouse, would trigger an audit of the truthful, individual, tax 
return filed by the other spouse. That conclusion by the trial judge discounts completely 
the very real possibility that Cathie intended to cause an audit of Lynn by her own filing 
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and sought advice from Couillard as to how to assure that such events would happen, 
seemingly by accident. Since no discovery was afforded to Lynn, he was not allowed 
any opportunity to develop that possibility. Further, the conclusion of law that an action 
by the IRS was "unforeseeable," in the absence of any discovery from the IRS or from 
Couillard, who works on tax returns as part of his business, is unsupportable. IRS 
practices, as could be disclosed in its deposition, combined with Couillard's knowledge 
of them as could be disclosed in his deposition, might very well lead to the conclusion 
that it was, in the circumstances of this case, foreseeable that an audit would result, or 
might have enabled Lynn, based on the testimony, to hire an expert witness who could 
opine as to the foreseeability. 
The trial court's refusal to allow any discovery as to the facts and circumstances 
of the filing of Cathy's false tax return, her dealings with Couillard with respect thereto, 
and the practices of the IRS generally in choosing audit targets and specifically in this 
circumstance, all of which is clearly material to the issues in the case and all of which is 
outside the knowledge of Lynn, was a clear abuse of discretion. Lynn was damaged by 
the audit. The audit plainly was the result of Cathie filing a false, joint tax return. The 
trial court should have afforded Lynn a fair opportunity to prove his claim. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing the dismissal of Counts I, II and III and the summary 
judgment in favor of Cathie and Couillard on Counts IV and V should be reversed, the 
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Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 
20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary 
judgment by the adverse party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a 
summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move 
with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any 
part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall 
be filed and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A 
summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability 
alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is 
not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the 
court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before 
it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist 
without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith 
controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without 
substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other 
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are 
just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and 
the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and 
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as 
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is 
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers 
or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. 
The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment 
is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as 
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, 
shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party 
opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts 
essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or 
may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken 
or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the court 
at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in 
bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party 
employing them to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses which 
the filing of the affidavits caused him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and 
any offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
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SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LYNN G. FOSTER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EVELYN L. SAUNDERS; SAUNDERS & 
SAUNDERS; GARY COUTLLARD; AND 
CATHIE I. FOSTER, 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Case No.: 030902227 
Honorable William B. Bohling 
Tins matter came before the Court for heating on August 4, 2003, on the motions to 
dismiss of defendants Evelyn L. Saunders and Saunders & Saunders (collectively, "Saunders"), 
Cathie I. Foster ("Foster"), and Gary R. Couillard ("Couillard"), and on plaintiff Lynn G. 
Foster's ("Plaintiff) motions to strike and to amend. Amy F. Sorenson and Nathan E. Wheatley 
appeared on behalf of Saunders, C. Richard Hemiksen and Rick C. Mellen appeared on behalf 
Foster, Couillard appeared pro se, and David W. Scofield appeared on behalf of Plaintiff. 
Hsv 
After having considered all memoranda and authorities therein, the arguments of counsel, 
the pleadings, and for good cause shown, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that 
1. Plaintiffs first claim in the amended complaint (the "Complaint") for wrongful 
initiation, use and/or continuation of civil proceedings against Saunders, Foster, 
and Couillard is dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted because it is barred by the judicial proceedings privilege and 
because the tort applies to the wrongful institution of civil proceedings, not 
arguments, as a matter of law; 
2. Plaintiffs second claim in the Complaint, for slander of title against Saunders and 
Foster, and his third claim, for slander of title against Saunders, are dismissed 
with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted 
because they are barred by the judicial proceedings privilege, by the doctrine of 
claim preclusion, and by the one year statute of hmitation for libel and slander, set 
forth at Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-29(4); 
3. Accordingly, Saunders5 Motion to Dismiss is granted, and the Court dismisses the 
first, second, and third claims of Plaintiff s Complaint against Saunders with 
prejudice; Foster's Motion to Dismiss is granted in part and denied in part, and 
the Court dismisses only the first and second claims of the Complaint agamst 
Foster with prejudice; Couillard's Motion to Dismiss is granted in part and denied 
in part, and the Court dismisses only the first claim of the Complaint against 
Couillard with prejudice; 
4. Foster and Couillard shall refile their motions to dismiss the fourth and fifth 




economic relations, as motions for summary judgment, which motions shall 
include statements of material undisputed fact as required by Utah. Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56; 
Plaintiffs Motion to Amend is denied on the grounds that amendment can not 
cure the defects in the claims for wrongful initiation of civil proceeding and 
slander of title, and that there is no need for amendment as to the claims for 
breach of duty and interference with prospective economic relations; and 
Plaintiffs Motion to Strike is denied. 
DATED this 2 day ofjfligiist, 2003 JguBust '< 
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economic relations, as motions for summary judgment, wliich motions shall 
include statements of material undisputed fact as required by Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56; 
5. Plaintiffs Motion to Amend is denied on the grounds that amendment can not 
cure the defects in Hie claims for wrongful initiation of civil proceeding and 
slander of title, and that there is no nc^d for amendment as to the claims for 
breach of duty and interference with prospective economic relations; and 
6. Plaintiffs Motion to Strike is denied. 
DATED this day of August, 2003. 
BY THE COURT: 
William B. Bohling 
District Court Judge 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LYNN G. FOSTER 
vs. 
Plaintiff, 
EVELYN L. SAUNDERS; SAUNDERS & 
SAUNDERS; GARY COUILLARD; AND 
CATHIE I. FOSTER 
Defendants. 
* ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
* Case No. 030902227 
Judge William B. Bohling 
This matter came before the court on Defendant, Cathie I. Foster's Motion for 
Summary Judgment on the 22nd day of December 2003. The Plaintiff and his attorney 
David W. Scofield were present, the Defendant, Cathie I. Foster and her attorney C. 
Richard Henriksen, Jr. were present and Gary Couiliard appeared pro se. The court after 
1 
a review of the various memoranda concerning Defendant Cathie I. Foster's Motion for 
Summary Judgment from both parties and after hearing arguments of counsel, the 
pleadings and for good cause shown, the court hereby finds and orders as follows: 
1. The court finds that there are no genuine issues of material fact upon 
which a reasonable jury could find in favor of the Plaintiff on either the fourth cause of 
action or the fifth cause of action. 
2. The court finds that Plaintiff's Rule 56(f) objection is not well taken as 
no further discovery needs to be taken to determine the issues remaining in this case. 
3. The court finds that there was no duty or breach of duty that would be 
applicable to either the fourth or fifth cause of action. 
4. The court finds that there was no foreseeablility of harm with regards 
to potential damages that might arise from the mistake on the tax return, thus creating no 
potential liability on the fourth and fifth causes of action. 
5. That the Plaintiff has failed to establish that he can prove that any of 
Defendant Cathie I. Foster's conduct was the cause of the harm or injury that Plaintiff may 
have incurred. 
6. The court finds that there was no merit in the bringing of the fourth or 
fifth cause of actions. 
2 
7. The court finds that there is no genuine issues of material fact that 
exist in this case that would prevent the court from granting the Motion for Summary 
Judgment on the fourth and fifth causes of action. 
WHEREFORE based upon the foregoing findings and the memorandum, 
pleadings on file and the arguments in this case the court orders that the Plaintiff's fourth 
and fifth causes of action are dismissed with prejudice's to Defendant, Cathie I, Foster. 
is DATED thi £W day of 2004. 
Y THE COURT: 
Approved as to form: 
William E&BbhH 
Third District O&J&jta 
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Attorney for Plaintiff Lynn G. Foster 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Gary R. Couillard, pro se 
184 "S" Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
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DAVID W. SCOFIELD - 4140 
PETERS SCOFIELD PRICE 
A Professional Corporation 
340 Broadway Centre 
111 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 322-2002 
Facsimile: (801) 322-2003 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LYNN G. FOSTER, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
EVELYN L. SAUNDERS; SAUNDERS & 
SAUNDERS; GARY COUILLARD; and 
CATHIE I. FOSTER, 
Defendants. 
STIPULATION TO ENTRY OF ORDER OF 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF 
DEFENDANT COUILLARD ON THE SAME 
GROUNDS AS SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS 
GRANTED IN FAVOR OF CATHIE I. FOSTER 
Case No. 030902227 
Judge William B. Bohling 
Plaintiff and Defendant Gary Couillard, as the only defendant remaining with 
claims against him, agree and stipulate as follows: 
1. On February 27, 2004, the Court signed its order granting summary judgment 
in favor of Defendant Cathie I. Foster and against Plaintiff, which order was entered on 
March 1,2004. 
2. Defendant Couillard had filed, on December 29, 2003, a motion to join in 
FILED DISTRICT DO0RT 
Third Judicial District 
SALTUKEQ^xJ"* 
Cathie I. Foster's arguments and motion for summary judgment. The Order of summary 
judgment entered by the Court on March 1,2004, does not deal with Couillard's motion, 
and Couillard therefore remains a party hereto. Nevertheless, Plaintiff and Defendant 
Couillard believe that the Court's order with respect to Cathie I. Foster would also apply 
to the claims against Couillard. Therefore, to avoid unnecessary expense and 
duplication of effort, Plaintiff and Defendant Couillard stipulate and agree that an order 
may be entered upon his pending motion, granting a summary judgmnet in favor of 
Defendant Couillard, and against Plaintiff, on the same grounds as the summary 
judgment was granted in favor of Defendant Cathie I. Foster. 
3. The parties to this Stipulation jointly move for entry of an order in accordance 
herewith. 
DATED this 9th day of March, 2004. 
Digitally signed 




Gary Couillard, Pro Se 
PETERS SCOFIELD PRICE 
A Professional Corporation 
DAVID W. SCOFIELD 





Based on the foregoing stipulation, and good cause appearing, 
IT IS ORDERED: 
That summary judgment is entered against Plaintiff and in favor of Defendant 
Couillard, on the same grounds as summary judgment was heretofore entered in favor 
of Defendant Cathie I. Foster, thereby disposing of all claims against all parties. 
DONE this Z.*3 day of Juner2003. 
BY THE COURT: 






FILED DISTRICT C0UR1 
Third Judicial District 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LYNN G. FOSTER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EVELYN L. SAUNDERS; SAUNDERS & 
SAUNDERS; GARY COUILLARD; and 
CATHIE I. FOSTER, 
Defendants. 
MINUTE ENTRY DECISION 
AND ORDER 
CASE NO. 030902227 
Before the Court is plaintiff's Motion to Alter or Amend 
Judgment, submitted on plaintiff's May 5, 2 004, Notice. Neither 
party requested oral argument. 
Having considered the parties' Memoranda, and good cause 
appearing, the Motion is denied. The Court is persuaded by the 
arguments set forth in defendant Evelyn Saunders' and Cathie 
Foster's Memoranda addressing the issues of law. The Court 
perceives the argument as a renewal of the factual issues that have 
been previously addressed by this Court and the divorce judge, and 
believes the claim was properly dismissed under Gilbert v. Ince, 
981 P.2d 841. This constitutes the Order of the Court. No other 
Order need be submitted. 
2\ Dated this day of May, 20 CM . 
WILLIAM B. BOHLING 
DISTRICT COURT~~JUDGE 
FOSTER V. SAUNDERS PAGE TWO MINUTE ENTRY 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this, day of May, 
2004: 
David W. Scofield 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
111 E. Broadway, Suite 340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Matthew L. Lalli 
Amy F. Sorenson 
Nathan E. Wheatley 
Attorneys for Defendants Saunders 
15 W. South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1004 
C. Richard Henriksen 
Attorney for Defendant Foster 
320 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Gary R. Couillard 
Pro se 
184 S Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
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